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Idealist Views

In Britain, where empiricism and utilitarianism were the leading philosophical movements in the early nineteenth century, there was often a view that there was a relation between a thinker (subject) and the observed object. British Idealists, however, found it strange that only one part of this relation (the object) existed independent of the other. Therefore, the Idealists came to the point of a complex unity of experience. Matter, therefore, cannot exist independelty of mind. Ideas, they argue, are what connect thoughts to objects. Therefore, British Idealists criticised dualism. Doing this, they find a way to unite such things as mind and nature, nature and environment or individualism and collectivism. They say that each has something of the other, and hence overcome dualism not by obliterating differences, but by some sort of unity in diversity. By this, I mean that the, supposedly contradictory, objects or events are united by seeing what each has of the other.

Henry Jones and Michael Oakeshott used this “unity in diversity” when they addressed theoretical problems by looking at opposing views, both of which they’d accuse of being one-sided, because they did not take into account the other perspective. And Jones and Caird used this concept to address socialism and individualism: both had to acknowledge the good points in the other perspective.

Collingwood holds another view in uniting everything in the world: he stated that behind every perception, proposition or action lies a presupposition, and behind that presupposition lies another one, and so on until we end up with an absolute presupposition. He distinguished the absolute presupposition from those relative presuppositions that are related to it, by saying that an absolute presupposition is neither verifiable nor understandable by experience. Absolute presuppositions may change, but that’s not a matter of fashion, choice or consciousness. Rather, they entail "the abandonment of all [our] most firmly established habits and standards for thought and action” (51)

There were still internal differences among the Absolute Idealists, to which group most British Idealists belonged. Bradley, for instance, has been criticized by Jones for not totally overcoming dualism, because in his Appearance and Reality (8) he fails to completely unite appearance and reality. Bradley namely says that what is reality is consistent and non-contradictory, and what is not, must be appearance. Then, he tries to close the gap by stating that there are degrees of consistency and non-contradiction, and hence also degrees of reality.

Philosophy of Religion

Through the early nineteenth-century works of David Strauss, Ferdinand Baur and others, religion had become a subject for critical and scientific study, independent of one’s religious commitment. By the middle of the nineteenth century, this “scientific” approach to religion had established in Britain (especially among the members of the Church of England “Broad Church” movement, to which among others Edward Caird belonged). These people wanted to use a more analytical and “rational” approach to religion. (63) However, also in the Evangelical movement in the Church of England, to which Idealists such as Bernard Bosanquet belonged, there was a distinction between practice and dogma.

This “rational” approach to religion is explained by Bosanquet by saying that rationalism, curiosity, metaphor and deduction from metaphor operate by way of distortion. (63) He states that, to read Biblical texts, one must use a hermeneutic approach and try to interpret them – although he doubts whether the true meaning of sacred texts can be fully comprehended. Bosanquet also states that some religious beliefs don’t mean what people take them to mean. For instance, if we think of God as an infinite individual, Bosanquet sees the attribution of infinity to God as "inconsistent with every predicate which we attach to personality". (63)

T.H. Green challenged the creeds and church dogmas by stating that the creeds emerged out of a need to solve particular historically contingent problems and to convey the essence of Christ’s teachings once Jesus’ life passed out of living memory. However, according to Green, the creeds more legitimated the teachings of subsequent religious leaders than that they conveyed the message of Christ.

Green’s dislike for creedal rigidity caused him to greatly oppose Catholicism. Green viewed the Reformation as a positive event, for the breaking with catholic dogma showed the rationality behind the Reformation. However, Green also acknowledges that out of this Reformation emerged new creeds and dogmas. Green, therefore, viewed his own time as “still developing the seeds of the Reformation”. (70) He found that the ideals of the Reformation and English Commonwealth still needed to be realized within modern liberalism.

At times, one has questioned whether some of the British Idealists could be considered Christians. However, the Idealists viewed God as immanent in the world and found that the Divine and the human formed an inseparable spiritual unity. For Green and Ritchie, for instance, Christ is incarnate in the world and thus reflects the unity between God and man. For Ritchie, God reveals himself in man rather than being merely a Creator.

There were also significant disagreements among the British Idealists, for instance regarding the relation between God and the Absolute. For Bradley, for example, the meaning of God is related to religious consciousness, whereas the Absolute is complete experience. To worship it is to transfer it into an object and hence it will be less than something infinite. When one attributes a personality to God, one assumes a “self” and an “other” that is not almighty. Bradley therefore states that religion includes a contradiction, for it at once demands and rejects a perfect God. Jones, on the other hand, states that the Absolute is realized in finite centres, and these are more significant when they’re spiritual. He says that the unity of the Absolute doesn’t demand a personality, but wills that are freely able to unite. According to him, man is what he is as a result of God’s presence in him.

Freedom, the Will, and Morality

Both Green and Bosanquet have devoted a large amount of their writing to the concept of will, and both have connected this to morality and social philosophy.

Green, first, makes a clear distinction between will and desire. He says that one may desire many things, but cannot afford all of them. For instance, I may desire a book and a CD, but do not have enough money to afford both. By choosing either one, I make that thing my will. Green argues that this sort of will is always free – self-satisfaction is always free and is always the object of the will (67). Unthinking action, Green says, is no part of the will and is not free. Also, the motive behind the will is part of the will itself. So, one can never wonder if someone is acting like himself if he is willing some thing or action. Green also makes this clear, by stating that desire and will are unified with one’s self – no-one is who he is without it, and no will or desire is what it is without the person who desires or wills. Green also argues that character and circumstances (by “circumstances” he does not merely mean one’s situation at the moment of the willing, but also one’s state of health, family situation and the social expectations set for him) provide the motivations for one’s will, and therefore he argues that will is not free in all respects, because it is influenced by these external conditions. However, Green solves this paradox by stating that one’s circumstances are part of the individual.

For will involves choice, Green argues that reason is needed for will. Reason can shape one’s character and circumstances, so that the preferred state can be achieved. However, reason is underdeveloped in that it doesn’t recognize the ultimate goal of attaining the set of character and circumstances which lead to an ultimate harmony of the world. But reason and will cannot always recognize that state that is absolutely preferable. If what Green calls the “eternal consciousness” is not fully explicit in the world, reason and will may not recognize the same as good. For Green, the unimpeded action of the eternal consciousness via the individual's free exercise of reason is a prerequisite for the action of his absolutely free will. (67)

With regard to morality, Green states that the ultimate goal of the “moral agent” (the individual that uses will to do moral action) is to achieve one’s moral potential. However, one cannot fully realize these capabilities, but one can recognize them “in negative”. That means that given two options, one does realize which is the better one.

Self-realisation is also crucial to Bradley’s moral philosophy. According to him, like Green also implies, we have a duty to realize our best selves. As a result, self-realisation was directly connected to the “common good”. This common good is inconceivable without one being a member of a society, and self-realisation by acting morally was to be achieved in relation to others.

Bosanquet’s political and social philosophy, as outlined in his Philosophical Theory of the State (1899, second edition 1910), is largely influenced by his theory of the will. He more generalizes the will, by proposing a “general will”, which, according to him, is the “real” will of the community, and hence the “real” will of each of its members. He explains this by saying that to get to know one’s real will, one must also take into account all the other circumstances and the wills and feelings of others.

Bosanquet connects this “general will” with the “common good”, which is to be achieved by moral agents. He writes: “The General Will seems to be, in the last resort, the ineradicable impulse of an intelligent being to a good extending beyond itself, in as far as that good takes the form of a common good.” (7) Bosanquet defines this as the perfection of the human personality, the excellence of souls, and, like Green, the complete realisation of the individual. (63)

The British Idealists criticized utilitarianism and individualism. To them, morality was something social and connected to political activity and social work. As Boucher and Vincent write in British Idealism and Political Theory (2001), “morality, for Idealism, was social in character. Acting morally entailed a reciprocal concern for others, and not merely a desire to achieve a private state of mind like happiness or utility.” (70)

Political Philosophy

The Idealists use the concept of the “general will” (see above) to explain their ideas about state action. To them, the “general will”, the “real will” of the society, is manifested by each member’s “real will”. As a result, the state is seen as a moral agent, with ideals and purposes which it formulated and pursued for the betterment of society as a whole.” (70) D.G. Ritchie, therefore, saw the state as the best representative of the “general will” of the community. That is not to assume that one should follow the state blindly. If a state did not follow its purpose – that is, to promote the “common good” -, individuals should resist it. Both Green and Ritchie argue that if a law is contradictory to what one views as the sustaining of the morally good, one should disobey it.

The Idealists, even though they opposed individualism, supported individual freedom. Many can be seen as liberals – “liberalism” is here the left-wing political movement similar to that in America, not the right-wing movement as the term is commonly used in the Netherlands -, but even Jones, who is viewed as a socialist, made a clear distinction between true and false socialism: true socialism, according to him, is ethical and communitarian, and provided conditions for individual moral development; in false socialism, there is no room for individual freedom. For the Idealists, individualism and socialism weren’t contradictory.

The Idealists, however, greatly disagreed on the question to which extent the state should intervene in individual freedom. Bosanquet and Green, for instance, placed high priority on self-reliance, and hence opposed a too great state involvement, whereas Jones and J.H. Muirhead can be seen as social liberals. Between the later Idealists, Collingwood and Oakeshott, the same disagreement existed: Collingwood argued that blatant inequalities reflected inequality in relations offeree, which in turn undermined the individual development of freedom of choice. Oakeshott, on the other hand, had a much more limited conception of state action, being that the state had to uphold non-instrumental laws that would permit individual initiative or choice.

Oakeshott says that law is not typically to impose a particular duty or goal on men, but instead, like Thomas Hobbes also said, it seeks simply to facilitate their dealings with one another (32). Law, therefore, is only meant to provide conditions in which members of the society can contract mutually. Oakeshott therefore argues that law doesn’t restrict freedom.

Bosanquet also disproves the idea that laws would restrict freedom, but he does so in another way: for he argues that the state is to strive for the “common good” and the “general will” is each person’s individual “real will”, he says that people may at times be forced to do certain actions for their own good, and hence may be “forced to be free” (63) by laws. Because Bosanquet so unites the state with individuals, he also says that it is mostly in light of one’s service to the state that one can speak of one’s identity (63). Bosanquet, as a result, is at times accused of being anti-democratic, but such accusations overlook the fact that he placed much value on liberty as the essence to the human person and his emphasis being placed on moral development of the human being. Bosanquet says that while laws and the state employ compulsion and restriction, they do so in a positive way, because they provide the conditions for liberty. This is similar to what Oakeshott says about laws creating the conditions so that individuals can contract securely.

Oakeshott has been a clear conservative, but one may doubt that of Bosanquet, because in the 1910s he supported the Labour Party and he favoured worker ownership and emphasized the role a state could have to promote social well-being.

Philosophy of History

The best-known British Idealist that was actively involved in the philosophy of history, is Collingwood, although also Bradley has written about the topic.

Bradley’s views on history were inspired by his reading of German biblical critics. These views in religious studies – which hesitate to take at face value the testimony of miracles that contradict the laws of nature – was at the time appropriate, but Bradley tried to extend it to history, hereby overlooking the contrast between the uniformity in nature to the variety in human history. (13)

Collingwood, as I have said before, based his philosophy on the idea of an absolute presupposition. This, he also applied to his philosophy of history. To him, the past does not exist independently of the present, but sort of lives on in it. He says that historical events, actions and processes may be reconstructed through a disciplined logic of “question and answer” (51). Investigation of history seeks to recreate these things not only by re-enacting the thoughts and actions, but also the questions to which they were a solution. If we only use our own presuppositions to research historical events or actions, we aren’t carrying out useful history.

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