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In this second chapter, and particularly in section 2.1, first I’ll have to define Idealism as it relates to philosophy. Its opposite, here, is Realism. Philosophical Realists view the world as existing independently of one’s perception. Reality, as a result, exists outside of people’s minds. Idealists, on the other hand, argue that reality always needs to have a relation to perception. Hence, as I stated in section 1.2, matter cannot exist independently of mind.
Among philosophers that hold Idealist views, there are still noticeable differences in the relation they see between the perceiver and the perceived.
Subjective Idealism is the type of Idealism used by George Berkeley. In this theory, there is a relation between the perceiver and the perceived object in which the object is nothing more than a collection of sense data in the perceiver (27). In subjective Idealism, all perception of the world is in fact perception of an idea. For example, if I see a tree, I cannot know if that tree is really there. And even if I touch it, my sense of touch only produces an idea that there is a tree. Reality, to Berkeley, is only within the mind, and all that is outside the mind can’t be perceived or even thought about. He, however, says that the true reality is in the mind of God and that therefore we all have the same idea about reality.
Subjective Idealism is very similar to personal Idealism. Personal Idealism is defined as "the view that the minds that underlie reality are the minds of persons." (60) Personal Idealism rejects the idea that there is one single mind behind all the minds that perceive. As I said in chapter 1, personal Idealists place much value on the individual. Vincent and Boucher (70) consider it to be the same as subjective Idealism, but use the word personal Idealism. Henry Sturt and Andrew Seth are a few of the personal Idealists among the British Idealist movement. They however also argue that their Idealism is based on that of Green, Bradley and Bosanquet (see below).
When compared to Berkeley’s Idealism, the German Idealists (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, etc.), who had a great influence on the British Idealists, all hold “objective Idealist” views.
My sources disagree on the definition of “objective” Idealism. In the Free Online Encyclopaedia, it is defined as "a metaphysics that postulates that there is in an important sense only one perceiver, and that this perceiver is one with that which it [He?] perceives." (26) An important objective Idealist is said to be the American philosopher Josiah Royce, who is often mentioned along with the British Idealists. Ian Heath, however, defines objective Idealism as a type of Idealism that adds to the experience of subjective Idealism (which is considered “static”) relationships that are dynamic. Heath (36) says that objective Idealists argue that objects get their value and meaning through humans or other living, and perceiving, species. An important difference between objective and subjective Idealism, here, is that objective Idealism emphasizes the will: we perceive something because we want to perceive it.
Others, however, consider objective Idealism to be the same as absolute Idealism: "This is a form of Idealism whereby reality, though mental or spiritual, does not depend on the human mind in particular but comprises a single spiritual entity." (5) This one single entity is then called the Absolute.
The Encyclopaedia Britannica article on western forms of philosophical Idealism (20) makes a clear differentiation between the forms of Idealism, when it considers the German Idealists: first, as I said, all are considered objective Idealists as compared to Berkeley, but Fichte is, when not compared to Berkeley, himself a subjective Idealist, because he places the subject above the object. Then, Schelling is an objective Idealist and Hegel is considered an absolute Idealist, using a dialectical approach to unite thesis and antithesis into the synthesis and so create the Absolute Spirit.
Absolute Idealism may be defined as "the view that the existence of material things depends upon one underlying mental reality rather than upon the mental contents of individual observers," (60) hereby distinguishing it from types of Idealism that place more value on the individual.
This type of Idealism is what many British Idealists use. F.H. Bradley is specifically mentioned (5), but, as I have already shown in chapter 1, other British Idealists held similar views, and, ironically, Vincent and Boucher (70) specifically mention Bradley as not totally overcoming dualism, because of his degrees of reality and appearance (see section 1.2).
As I have shown in section 1.2, and as has hopefully become even clearer in this section, the British Idealists all hold views that can be categorized among one of the forms of philosophical Idealism.
Though much more variegated than some commentaries would seem to suggest, British Idealism was generally marked by several broad tendencies: a belief in an Absolute [...]." (25) Even though this piece of writing is correct in that there’s a lot of variation among the British Idealists (as hopefully has become apparent in section 1.1), it is incorrect to assume that all British Idealists were absolute Idealists. As I said in section 1.2, most are, indeed. And certainly, most of the influential ones are. Vincent and Boucher (70) say that “all of the authors discussed in this book were committed to versions of absolute Idealism, even the representatives of the new generation, Collingwood and Oakeshott.
As I said in 1.2, the Idealists applied their Idealist views in many ways. For example, Jones, Oakeshott and Caird applied Idealist views to theoretical problems, such as the contradiction between socialism and individualism. They’d do so by looking at what each side of the problem had in common with the other – like, what features of socialism are in individualism.
Even though absolute Idealism is the most important view among the British Idealists, there were a number of personal Idealists. These (eg. Andrew Seth) criticized absolute Idealism on two grounds: first, because it refused to appropriately acknowledge human experience (it is said that the individual may be absorbed into an Absolute), and second, for it failed to see the importance of the will in human experience. Hence, absolute Idealism overlooked the importance of individuals. In Andrew Seth’s view, absolute Idealism was always in imminent danger of consigning the individual to insignificance. (70)
Absolute and personal Idealism are similar in at least one way: they share their mutual enemy in Naturalism. Some personal Idealists, indeed, argued that absolute Idealism wasn’t that different from their viewpoint. Like Sturt, who said that his Idealism was a development of, rather than a departure from, the Idealism of Green, Bradley and Bosanquet. (70) And Boyce Gibson contended that the central idea of absolute Idealism - that the real is rational - was also upheld by personal Idealism, but "from the point of view of the personal experient'.17" (70).
All in all, it can be concluded that the British Idealists all applied Idealist views in philosophy. While most were absolute Idealists, some can be counted among the personal Idealists. Even though these groups greatly opposed each other, it may also be said that personal Idealism has the same principles as does absolute Idealism, only from an individual's perspective.